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DEATH KNELL FOR TRAGESER: SECTION 504 OF
THE REHABILITATION ACT IN LIGHT OF NORTH
HA VEN
I. INTRODUCTION
The Rehabilitation Act of 19731 has been in existence for almost a decade
and covers some forty to sixty-eight million handicapped people.2 The Act was
intended to be the first stroke in a broad campaign to eliminate handicap dis-
crimination. While the handicapped have become a more visible minority since
the Act was passed, the promise of equal employment outside the arena of
federal government and federal contractors has been largely illusory.
3
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination on the basis
of handicap by the recipients of federal money. 4 Unfortunately, the enforce-
ment of this provision has been impeded, because most jurisdictions have
carved out an exception to this broad prohibition in the field of employment.5
The basis for this exception comes from the belief that, since the language of
section 504 is the same as that used in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, it was
meant to have the same scope as Title VI. Title VI does not cover employment
practices unless funds were received by the program for the primary purpose
of providing employment.6 Due to the similarity between the two antidis-
crimination provisions, courts have held that this limitation applies to section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well.7
' Act of Sept. 26, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, §§ 501-504, 87 Stat. 390 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
791-794 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
2 Wolff, Protecting the Disabled Minority: Rights and Remedies Under Sections 503 and 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 25, 30 (1978). [Hereinafter cited as Wolff.]
3 Statistics on the number of handicapped persons are uncertain. At the time of the passage of
the Rehabilitation Act its sponsors estimated that there were 22 million physically handicapped
adults. Of this number 14 million would be able to work if given the opportunity. 118 CONG. RE.
3321 (1972). Of 5.6 million mentally retarded persons, 90% would be able to work with proper
assistance. Id. The following figures were estimated for those handicapped employed: of 150,000
blind adults, approximately 50,000 were employed; of 60,000 paraplegics, approximately 15-20%
were employed; and, of those 200,000 adults with cerebral palsy, only a handful were working. Id.
For a discussion of these figures see Wolff, at 28-32.
4 Section 504 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). It provides that "No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of
handicap be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance."
5 See Simpson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Carmi v. Metropolitan
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 894 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1978); Sabol v.
Board of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 892 (D.N.J. 1981); Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, Kan., 508 F.
Supp. 1021 (D. Kan. 1981); Guertin v. Hackerman, 496 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
6 The provisions of Title VI are limited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). It provides: "Nothing
contained in this title shall be construed to authorize action under this title of any employment
practice of any employer, employment agency or labor organization except where a primary objec-
tive of the federal financial assistance is to provide employment." This section is known as section
604 of the Civil Rights Act.
7 See supra note 5.
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The issue of section 504's coverage has never been squarely faced by the
United States Supreme Court. But, in May, 1982 the Court did rule that the
employment limitation of Title VI is inapplicable to suits brought under sec-
tion 901 of the Education Amendments,8 which Is another statute modeled af-
ter the antidiscrimination provision contained in Title VI. The Court's resolu-
tion of the Education Amendments' coverage will obviously affect future
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act.
This note will examine the interplay between Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, section 901 of the Education Amendments and section 504 of the Rehabil-
itation Act for the purposes of analyzing whether section 504 is meant to cover
suits for employment discrimination. The prevailing view has been that the
employment limitation has been engrafted onto section 504 by the 1978
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act.9 The analysis in this article will focus
upon the rationale for this view by fully examining the holding of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc.10
This Note will argue that the employment limitation of Title VI was never
intended by Congress to apply to suits brought under section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act. It will further argue that such an application frustrates the stat-
utory scheme of the Act to remedy employment discrimination on the basis of
handicap.
To bolster these arguments, this Note will apply the analysis used by the
Supreme Court in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell," on the issue of
Education Amendments' coverage, to the coverage issue under the Rehabilita-
tion Act. From there it will be argued that the ruling in Trageser should be
reexamined and that the anti-discrimination provision of section 504, like that
contained in the Education Amendments, was intended by Congress to act as a
broad prohibition against all forms of discrimination.
Finally, the restrictive test set forth by the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Simpson v. Reynolds Metal Co.' 2 for all suits brought under the anti-
discrimination provision of the Rehabilitation Act, not merely employment
suits, will be analyzed. In order to prove a case under the Simpson standard,
the plaintiff must show (1) that he or she is a direct or indirect beneficiary of a
federally funded program, and (2) that the alleged discrimination was "in con-
nection with that program or activity."' 3 It will be argued that, while Simpson
sets forth a fairer test than does Trageser, it nevertheless frustrates Congress'
desire to remove barriers which discriminate against the handicapped in fed-
eral programs.
8 Section 901 of the Education Amendments is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). It provides:
"No person in the United States shall on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance ......
9 See supra note 5.
0 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1978).
1- 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
12 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
IS Simpson, 629 F.2d at 1232.
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II. CRITICAL PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
In 1964 Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act to address discrimination
on the basis of race, color and national origin. Title VI of the Act contains a
broad prohibition against discrimination by federal grant recipients. Section
601 provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of race,
color or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing any federal financial assistance.' 1 4 The ultimate remedy under Title VI for
a violation of the Act is termination of the offending party's federal funding. 5
Shortly after the Civil Rights Act was enacted, Congress amended Title VI
to exempt most employment practices from its coverage. Section 604 provides
that actions may not be brought under Title VI for discriminatory employment
practices except where a primary objective of the federal funds received by the
agency is to provide employment. 6 The effect of the section 604 restriction is
that individuals with employment claims must seek redress under Title VII.17
Title VII deals solely with discriminatory employment practices. Its remedies
are significantly different from the termination of funding remedy in Title VI.
Under Title VII, courts may enjoin the discriminatory practice and order af-
firmative action. Courts may also order that the party violating the Act rein-
state employees, with or without back pay, as well as provide any equitable
relief which it determines appropriate. 8
The fact that section 604 was added after the Civil Rights Act was passed
has been a source of debate for those interpreting its effect upon later anti-
discrimination statutes. It has been argued that the provision clarified the orig-
inal scope of Title VI, because it was never intended to cover employment
practices.' Others have argued that Title VI did reach employment practices
before section 604 was added, and therefore the exemption was a substantive
change in Title VI.'0
III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
In 1973, Congress formally recognized that, while much of the population
in the United States enjoys a high quality of life, society's benefits are often
denied to the millions of children and adults with mental and physical handi-
4 Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-253 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1976)).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976).
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
19 See 110 CONG. REc. 12714-12720 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Kuhn, Title IX: Em-
ployment and Athletes are Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 GEo. L.J. at 53, cited in North Haven,
102 S. Ct. 1912, 1922, n.20 (1982).
20 See 110 CONG. REc. 14219-14220 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Hollard); Comment, Eliminating
Sex Discrimination in Educational Institutions: Does Title IX Reach Employment? 129 U. PA. L.
REV. at 447, cited in North Haven, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1922, n.20 (1982).
1983]
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caps.2 1 Traditionally, the primary responsibility for coping with these handi-
caps has fallen on the individual and his or her family. With the passage of the
Rehabilitation Act, however, Congress acknowledged that, to completely inte-
grate the handicapped into normal "living, working and service patterns," gov-
ernment must share the responsibility.2 2
To spearhead the effort against handicap discrimination, Congress enacted
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act.2 3 Title V, in three sections, forbids discrimi-
nation against the handicapped in federally funded activities by a) the federal
government,24 b) federal contractors,25 and c) recipients of federal grants.20
Sections 501 and 503, respectively, prohibit the federal government and federal
contractors from treating the handicapped any differently than other workers.
In fact, these two classes of employers have an affirmative duty under the Act
to hire the disabled. Federal grant recipients are governed by section 504 of the
Act, which is patterned after the antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil
Rights Act.
In 1977, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
promulgated regulations to implement section 504's prohibition against handi-
cap discrimination after being prodded by an Executive Order from President
Carter.2 7 The regulations outline four areas in which discrimination is prohib-
ited by recipients of federal funding: 1) employment, 28 2) preschool, elemen-
tary and secondary education,29 3) post-secondary education,( and 4) health,
welfare and social services.31 These regulations apply to each recipient of feder-
al financial assistance and to each program or activity that benefits from such
assistance.32
To enforce these regulations, HEW adopted the procedural provisions of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.33 These procedures provide for compliance
reviews, investigations into alleged violations of the Act, and termination of
funds where discriminatory practices are confirmed.34 In 1978 Congress
amended the Rehabilitation Act to make all remedies, procedures and rights
set forth in Title V available to individuals alleging discrimination under sec-
tion 504 of the Act.35
31 White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act, Pub. L. No. 93-516, §§ 300-306,
§ 301(2) & (3), 88 Stat. 1631-1634, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 1879.
2 Id. at § 301(7).
23 S. REP. No. 93-318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2076.
24 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
25 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
26 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
27 Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
23 45 C.F.R. § 84.11 (1981).
39 45 C.F.R. § 84.31 (1981).
30 45 C.F.R. § 84.41 (1981).
31 45 C.F.R. § 84.51 (1981).
32 45 C.F.R. § 80.2 (1981).
- 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1981).
, 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-.10 (1981).
31 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2), (b) (Supp. IV 1980).
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IV. A COMPARISON OF THE REMEDIAL PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
AND THE REHABILITATION ACT
The statutory scheme under the Rehabilitation Act is different than the
one provided under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under the Civil Rights Act,
claims for employment discrimination on the basis of race, color or national
origin are brought under Title VII of the Act. The remedial provisions of Title
VII provide that courts may enjoin employers from continuing an unlawful em-
ployment practice, and order appropriate affirmative relief "which may in-
clude, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or with-
out back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate." 8 For whatever reasons, Congress did not include the "handi-
capped" among the categories of workers protected by Title VII. Nevertheless,
many of the remedies of Title VII are available to the handicapped when they
are federal employees.37
Under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, coverage for handicap-based
employment discrimination is extended only on the basis of the receipt of fed-
eral grants by the employer.38 This means that relief for the handicapped em-
ployee under section 504 depends upon the employer's status as a federal
grantee. To hold that individual actions under the statute are restricted by
Title VI's employment exemption, as some courts have done, effectively
removes a large number of suits from the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act.
Under the Civil Rights Act, section 604's restriction merely means that indi-
viduals must proceed under Title VII. Under the Rehabilitation Act, however,
the same restriction denies any remedy at all to many victims of handicap-
based discrimination. " Such a result can only frustrate the statutory scheme
enacted by Congress to redress invidious employment practices.
V. Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center: SECTION 604 BECOMES A PART
OF SECTION 504
A. The Case
Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc.,40 was the first case to hold
that the employment limitation provision contained in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act applied to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Trageser was em-
ployed as the director of nursing by the Libbie Rehabilitation Center. She suf-
fered from retinitis pigmentosa, a hereditary and progressive disease that im-
pairs eyesight. During a regular inspection by the Department of Health, the
inspector noted that Trageser's eyesight had deteriorated since the last inspec-
36 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Under the "any other equitable relief" provision, the Su-
preme Court has ruled that awards of seniority may be made. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747 (1976). In addition, section 2000e-5(k) provides for an award of attorney's fees to the
prevailing party.
37 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976).
31 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
39 See Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 679 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 892 (1980).
40 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1978).
1983]
5
Webster-O'Keefe: Death Knell for Trageser: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act i
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tion. He asked the administration what they intended to do about Trageser's
condition. As a result of these comments, the board of directors resolved to
dismiss her approximately six weeks later.41
Trageser brought an action under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
claiming that the center had violated the statute by firing her because of her
visual handicap. She alleged that the corporation's acceptance of substantial
funds in the form of medicaid, medicare, veteran's administration reimburse-
ment and welfare payments brought them under the purview of section 504.42
But the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. According to the majority
opinion, Trageser did not state a cause of action under section 504 because the
financial assistance received by the Center was not money given for the pri-
mary purpose of providing employment. Rather, it was given for the purpose
of compensating the center for the treatment of patients entitled to the bene-
fits of that aid.43
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals justified its restrictive reading of the
Rehabilitation Act's coverage by pointing to the 1978 amendments.4 Among
other things, those amendments expressly state that any person injured by the
discriminatory employment practices of a federal recipient is entitled to the
same remedies, procedures and rights available under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.45 To the court, Congress' selection of Title VI remedies "could not
have been inadvertent. ' '46 Rather, the court reasoned, the selection further il-
lustrated that Title VI served as more than a model for the Rehabilitation Act;
it was the stone from which the handicapped discrimination provisions were
chiseled. In all respects, the court concluded, the two acts were intended to
have identical coverage.
The court further noted that the most important limitation placed on Ti-
tle VI's coverage was section 604.41 That section restricts enforcement of em-
ployment activities under the Civil Rights Act to those programs which have
received federal money for the purpose of providing employment.49 According
to the Trageser court, Congress intended this limitation to be carried over to
the Rehabilitation Act. Hence, a handicapped person cannot gain judicial relief
from employment discrimination unless one of two conditions is met: either
the offending employer must have received federal assistance for the primary
objective of providing employment, or the aggrieved party must have been an
intended beneficiary of the federal aid.50 Plaintiffs who cannot meet either of
these conditions, the Trageser court explained, would not be entitled to relief
were they suing under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; and, consequently, they
41 Trageser, 590 F.2d at 88.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 88-89.
" Id. at 88.
4" 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1979).
46 Trageser, 590 F.2d at 89.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 88.
4" 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976).
50 Trageser, 590 F.2d at 89.
[Vol. 85
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are not entitled to relief under the identically worded Rehabilitation Act.
B. The Analysis
Although Trageser's reasoning has been accepted by other jurisdictions,51
Hart v. County of Alameda52 offers a more plausible explanation for the differ-
ential treatment given to the different sections of the Rehabilitation Act by
Congress. In Hart, the court noted that the language of the antidiscrimination
provisions of Title VI and section 504 is, indeed, identical. The court also
noted that both statutes were designed to redress employment discrimination
and, hence, share a kinship of purpose. It is not surprising, then, that Congress
looked to Title VI when it was attempting to supplement the remedial compo-
nents of the Rehabilitation Act.53 Because Congress used Title VI as a model,
however, does not mean that every aspect of Title VI was engrafted onto the
Rehabilitation Act.- Had that been Congress' intent, it could have simply
amended Title VI to include the handicapped.
A major part of Trageser's conclusion was based upon the rationale that
the employment exclusion did not limit section 504, but merely confirmed the
original narrow meaning of that section.5' But neither the legislative history,
nor the case law prior to Trageser support the theory that section 504 was
intended to give rise to a cause of action for employment discrimination only
when the employer received federal funding for the purpose of providing jobs.
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act confirms that section 504
was patterned after section 601, not the whole of Title VI. Neither section
604, nor a similar provision limiting employment coverage, was included in Ti-
tle V of the Rehabilitation Act. This absence, with the strong focus of the Act
on employment opportunities for the handicapped, argues against the conclu-
sion that section 504 was intended originally to provide only limited relief to
victims of employment discrimination under programs in receipt of federal
monies.
Moreover, the holding in Trageser ignores precedent. The first case to deal
with discrimination under section 504 was an employment case, Gurmankin v.
Costanzo." Relying on the Act's statement of purpose s7 the court there found
51 See, e.g., Simpson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Carmi v. Metropol-
itan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Sabol v.
Board of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 892 (D.N.J. 1981).
82 485 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Cal. 1979); See also Carmi, 620 F.2d at 679 (McMillian, J.,
concurring).
83 Hart, 485 F. Supp. at 73.
" Under this theory the court was able to apply the 1978 Amendments to Trageser's claim
which was filed in 1976, without creating "substantial injustice." Trageser, 590 F.2d at 89.
11 Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 677 n.4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 892 (1980).
411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976). (blind woman brought action under the Civil Rights Act
and section 504 alleging that the hiring practices of a city school district discriminated against
visually handicapped teachers).
87 Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act for the express purpose, inter alia, of "promot[ing]
and expand[ing] employment opportunities in the public and private sectors for handicapped indi-
1983]
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that a refusal to hire a blind person as a teacher was the kind of discrimination
that section 504 was meant to prohibit.58 The same court later held that the
remedy of ordering the employment of a "plaintiff and members of her class in
positions from which they were purportedly excluded in violation of [section
504] could not better foster the goals of the [Act]." 59 In upholding these claims,
the issue of funding was not explored by the court.
In a later case, Davis v. Bucher, the court ruled that a blanket refusal to
hire former drug addicts constituted a violation under section 504.60 Although
the plaintiff had applied for a position with the city under Title II of the Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act, 1 there was no indication in the Da-
vis opinion that all of the allegedly discriminatory programs operated by the
city satisfied the standard in Trageser. Similarly, the plaintiff in Whitaker v.
Board of Higher Education alleged that his college employer had violated sec-
tion 504 when it denied him tenure because of his alcoholism. 2 His claim was
upheld without requiring proof that the primary purpose of federal funding
received by the school was to provide employment.6 3
In addition, the legislative history of the 1978 Amendments reveals no in-
tent to narrow the Rehabilitation Act's broad prohibition against handicapped
discrimination. The committee report on the proposed amendments expressed
approval of the HEW regulations which provided broad relief for employment
discrimination. The Amendments were intended to codify these regulations,
which already utilized the Title VI remedial procedures." They were not in-
tended to inhibit their effectiveness. Congress was dissatisfied with the resis-
tance the handicapped were encountering in attempting to vindicate their
rights under section 504.65 Its 1978 Amendments were intended to remedy this
situation by expanding enforcement of the Act through private suits. Yet, the
Trageser decision had the opposite effect.
Furthermore, as Judge McMillian notes in his concurring opinion in Carmi
viduals ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976).
58 Gurmankin, 411 F. Supp. at 989.
pa Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (attacking hos-
pital policy denying employment to anyone experiencing an epileptic seizure within two years from
date of job application). See also Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
0 451 F. Supp. 791, 798 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
6- 29 U.S.C. §§ 841-59 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
82 461 F. Supp. 99, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
ES But see Simon v. St. Louis Cty., 497 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (claim under section 504
was dismissed because the plaintiff did not allege in his pleading that the particular job category in
which he alleged discrimination was a program or activity receiving federal financial assistance).
", "It is the committee's understanding that the regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare with respect to procedures, remedies and rights under Section
504... conform with those promulgated under Title VI. Thus, this amendment codifies existing
practice as a specific statutory requirement." S. REP. No. 95-890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978),
reprinted in Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 678 n.6 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980).
65 124 Cong. Rec. S15591 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1978) (remarks of Senator Cranston), reprinted
in Hart v. County of Alameda, 485 F. Supp. 66, 72 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
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v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District,"6 the 1978 Amendments refer to Ti-
tle VI only insofar as it applies to "a person aggrieved. 6 7 The language of the
employment restriction contained in Title VI is specifically limited to depart-
ments and agencies, a category into which a private individual bringing suit
does not fit. Therefore, the language of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments
argues against the incorporation of the Title VI employment limitation.68 Con-
gress did not intend to hamper the remedies available to individuals aggrieved
by a restriction expressly limited to actions by agencies and departments.
C. Section 604 and Individual Suits
The holding in Trageser affects the status of private causes of action
brought under section 504. In its decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
assumes that, although the "employment limitation" expressly curtails the au-
thority of only federal departments and agencies, Congress implicitly intended
to restrict private suits as well. 9 Unfortunately, the court extends the employ-
ment limitation to private suits without citing any authority whatsoever, or
even providing reasoning to support the extension. A number of courts have
followed Trageser in the holding, but none have offered any justification for
the conclusion that this restriction applies to private suits.7 0
The most obvious argument against extending this provision to section 504
is its language. It refers only to departments and agencies. There is no mention
of limiting suits brought by individuals. Second, the language of the 1978
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act applies Title VI remedies, procedures
and rights to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act of any recipient.
This language indicates that the employment limitation was not intended to
apply to section 504 at all, let alone to individuals aggrieved by a violation of
the Act.
D. Enforcing Section 504 Through Private Suits
Although a private cause of action is not expressly created by section 504,
every United States Court of Appeals which has considered the issue has ruled
that the Rehabilitation Act is enforceable by private suit.7 1 The United States
GO 620 F.2d 672 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980).
e 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Carmi, 620 F.2d at 678.
*9 Trageser, 590 F.2d at 89. See Carmi, 620 F.2d 672; Sabol v. Board of Educ., 510 F. Supp.
892 (D.N.J. 1981); Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, 508 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Kan. 1981); Guertin
v. Hackerman, 496 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
70 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. In his dissenting opinion in Carmi, Judge
McMillian states that under Title VI section 604 should be interpreted to preclude most individ-
ual, as well as agency actions challenging employment discrimination in view of the overall statu-
tory scheme of Title VI. But, "this interpretation cannot be supported under the Rehabilitation
Act." 620 F.2d at 678.
71 Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 390 (1981);
Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
442 U.S. 397 (1979); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979);
Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th
1983]
9
Webster-O'Keefe: Death Knell for Trageser: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act i
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court has never dealt with the issue in the Rehabilitation Act con-
text, but it has ruled that civil actions are allowable under Title IX of the
Education Amendments.7 2 Because of the similarity between the anti-discrimi-
nation provisions of Title IX and section 504, a majority of federal courts have
held that the principles set forth in Cannon v. University of Chicago are deter-
minative of the same issue under section 504. In Cannon, the Supreme Court
observed the goals of the statute:
Title IX, like its model Title VI, sought to accomplish two related, but never-
theless somewhat different, objectives. First, Congress wanted to avoid the use
of federal resources to support discriminatory practices; second, it wanted to
provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices. Both
purposes were repeatedly identified in the debates on the two statutes.73
The first purpose is generally served by the administrative enforcement
scheme. This provides the Secretary of HEW with the power, upon a finding of
non-compliance with the antidiscrimination provision, to require compliance
with the section either by informal means or by the termination of federal
funding.74 This remedy is severe and is not appropriate for satisfying the sec-
ond purpose given in Cannon, nor is it intended to provide a forum for individ-
uals to press claims of discrimination against grant recipients.7 5 First, the very
fact that the remedy of termination of funding is severe may cause HEW to be
reluctant to invoke it.76 Second, the situation may not be remediable by termi-
nation of funding. In instances where federal assistance is provided under a
one-time grant, for example, the threat of discontinued subsequent-year fund-
ing is a harmless threat.7 Third, and perhaps most significantly, the remedy
granted by HEW procedures is not designed to aid individuals wronged by
discrimination. In Cannon, the Supreme Court was particularly impressed by
the fact that HEW complaint procedures did not allow the complainant to par-
ticipate in the administrative investigation or enforcement proceedings. If a
violation was found, the resulting compliance agreement might not include re-
lief for the complainant harmed by the violation of the Act.78 Finally, the deci-
sion to terminate funding may actually work to the disadvantage of the benefi-
ciaries of the funding, since cutting off the funding may mean that no further
service will be available to them. Legislative history shows that Congress,
aware of the severity of the remedy, intended it to be "a last resort, all
else-including lawsuits-failing. '7
The holding and the rationale of the Supreme Court in Cannon demon-
Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977).
" Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
" Id. at 704. Further comments by legislators regarding the purposes of Title VI and Title IX
can be found id. at 705 n.38.
7' 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.10 (1981).
75 Id. at §§ 80.8(a), 80.10(f). See also Camenisch, 616 F.2d at 135 (supporting authority).
7' Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705 n.38.
7 Id. at 704 n.37.
71 Camenisch, 616 F.2d at 135.
71See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7067 (1964) (Sen. Ribicoff), reprinted in Cannon, 441 U.S. 705
n.38.
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strate that the antidiscriminatory provisions, Title VI, Title IX and section
504, were intended to provide broad relief to individuals who pursue violations
of those provisions by federal grantees. To hold, as Trageser does, that the
original intent of Congress was to eliminate employment discrimination suits
from coverage under section 504 ignores the purposes of the Act and the ra-
tionale behind the holding in Cannon, which has been held to apply to section
504.80
VI. North Haven Board of Education v. Bell: TITLE IX ADDRESSES THE
EMPLOYMENT ISSUE
In May of 1982 the United States Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether Title IX of the Education Amendments was restricted by section
604 of the Civil Rights Act, the same issue Trageser considered with respect to
the Rehabilitation Act. North Haven Board of Education v. Bell involved two
employment discrimination claims against school boards under Title IX of the
Education Amendments.81 In one case, a female teacher alleged that the school
had violated Title IX when it refused to rehire her after a one-year maternity
leave.82 In the other case, a female guidance counselor claimed that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of gender with respect to job assign-
ment, working conditions and the school board's failure to renew her
contract.83
HEW threatened to take administrative action in both cases unless the
schools corrected their discriminatory employment practices. In response, both
school boards brought suit seeking to have HEW's employment regulations de-
clared invalid because HEW lacked authority under Title IX to regulate em-
ployment practices.8 4
The Court began its analysis by tracing the history of section 901. It noted
that Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 to pro-
scribe gender discrimination in education programs receiving federal assis-
tance.15 Title IX has two primary provisions. The first, section 901, is modeled
after section 601 of the Civil Rights Act and provides that: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 86
The second provision contains enforcement procedures for the Act. Sec-
tion 902 authorizes each agency awarding federal grants to education programs
to promulgate regulations to insure that recipients abide by section 901. The
ultimate sanction for violating the provisions of section 901 is termination of
:0 See supra note 71.
1 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982), af'g North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufsledler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.
1980).
82 North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1916.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1917.
8 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
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federal funds or a denial of future grants."7
In 1975 HEW issued regulations to implement section 901.88 Subpart E of
these regulations deals with employment practices. Generally, that section for-
bids discrimination in employment, recruitment, consideration or selection of
employees under any education program or activity operated by a recipient
which receives or benefits from federal financial assistance.8 9 It was these regu-
lations which the school boards in North Haven sought to have declared inva-
lid under the theory that Title IX was not intended to deal with employment
practices at all, but was limited to remedying gender discrimination against
students.
The regulations had been consistently struck down by federal courts con-
sidering the issue.90 Indeed, the validity of the regulations was even questioned
by their maker, the Department of Education. The Department had sought in
1981 to change the regulations to exclude from coverage employees of federal
programs not in receipt of federal money given to provide employment. But
the attorney general, given the power to approve such changes, refused to allow
the revision.9 1
Writing for the plurality in North Haven, Justice Blackmun began with an
examination of the statutory language of section 901. The district court had
held the section extended its protections to students only, as they were the
only logical beneficiaries of education programs.9 2 Blackmun found, however,
that the broad directive of section 901 that "no person" be discriminated
against on the basis of gender could be read to include employees, as well as
students." If Title IX is to be given "the scope that its origins dictate, we must
accord it a sweep as broad as its language. 94 The language of the Act was
silent on the employment practices issue, so Justice Blackmun turned to the
legislative history to discern congressional intent.9 5
As part of this analysis, Justice Blackmun addressed the school board's
87 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
88 HEW was initially given responsibility to promulgate regulations for Title IX. In 1979
HEW's functions under Title IX were transferred to the Department of Education. Therefore, the
regulations, which were originally printed at 34 C.F.R. pt. 86, were later recodified at 45 Fed. Reg.
30802 (1980). See North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1915 n.n.4 & 5.
, 34 C.F.R. § 106.51(a)(1) (1980).
90 See Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub. nom. United States
Dept. of Educ. v. Seattle Univ., 449 U.S. 1009 (1980); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600
F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa.
1980), appeal docketed, (3rd Cir. Nos. 80-2383, 80-2384); Kneeland v. Bloom Township High
School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1980); McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan.
1978), cited in North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1917 n.9.
,' See North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1918 n.12.
92 North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1980), afl'd sub. nom.
North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912 (1982).
93 North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1917.
" Id. at 1917-18 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
95 Id. at 1918.
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contention that section 901 was intended to have the same scope as its model,
section 601, which had never been interpreted to cover employment because of
the limiting language of section 604. It was the school board's contention that
because the Education Amendments borrowed the language of section 601,
they also adopted the limitations on coverage contained in section 604.96
Justice Blackmun disagreed. His reasoning was concisely broken down into
four sound points. First, the emphasis put on the history of Title VI was mis-
placed, in Blackmun's view. 7 Looking to Title VI's legislative history, he ar-
gued, deflects attention from the truly relevant time frame for discerning con-
gressional intent.98 It is Congress' intention in 1972, at the passage of the
Education Amendments which is significant in interpretting the Statute, and
not their intention in 1964, when they enacted Title VI.9 9
Second, although the meaning and applicability of Title VI are useful in
construing Title IX, they are useful only insofar as the language and history of
Title IX do not suggest a contrary interpretation.' 0 In Blackmun's opinion,
both the pre-enactment' 01 and post-enactment' 0' legislative history showed
that Title IX was clearly meant to address employment practices in education.
Blackmun's third, and perhaps most decisive point, dealt with the absence
of a specific limitation on suits for employment discrimination under Title IX.
Debate as to whether section 604 clarified the original meaning of section 601,
or limited it, was irrelevant.' 03 The critical factor was "that section 601 alone
was not considered adequate to exclude employees from the statute's coverage.
,6 Id. at 1922.
97 Id.
"id.
"id.
10 Id.
201 Justice Blackmun relied on pre-enactment remarks by Title IX's sponsor, Senator Bayh.
The Senator described section 901 as the "heart" of his amendment and stated that it was aimed
at employment discrimination. 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972), cited in North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at
1919.
In addition, the House's version of the bill included a section parallel to a section of 604 of the
Civil Rights Act, section 1004. That section was later deleted when submitted to the conference
committee. Blackmun found this persuasive that the Senate Bill must have prevailed for substan-
tive reasons. North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1922.
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the inclusion of section 604 in the House Bill was
really a drafting error. It was eliminated to avoid an inconsistent reading of portions of the Act
that related to the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. The House had determinated that section 604 had
been a mere clarification of Title VII. Since Title IX was modeled after section 601 no equivelent
to section 604 was needed to restrict employment suits from Title X's coverage; it would merely
have the same scope as its model. North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1931.
101 HEW submitted its regulations to Congress for approval, as required by the General Edu-
cation Provisions Act, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 567, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1). Under the
statutory procedure, if no resolutions of disapproval of the regulations were adopted within forty-
five days, the regulations would become effective. While there were resolutions of disapproval in-
troduced, none dealt with the employment regulations. North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1923.
103 Section 604 was added to Title VI shortly after the Civil Rights Act was enacted. The
reason for its enactment, as to whether it clarified the original scope of Title VI, or restricted it,
has been the subject of lengthy analysis in both Title IX and section 504 litigation. See North
Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1922 n.20.
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If Congress had intended that Title IX have the same reach as Title VI,...
we assume that it would have enacted counterparts to both section 601 and
section 604. '104
Finally, Blackmun noted that while the two statutes "may be similar in
language and objective, we must not fail to give effect to the differences be-
tween them."10 5 The differences between the two statutes were sufficient, in
Blackmun's eyes, to give the acts contrary meanings. The legislative history of
Title IX showed that Congress intended to address employment discrimination
against women through Title IX. The statutory language, which applied to
"any person," and did not contain a restriction on employment coverage simi-
lar to section 604, was indicative that Congress intended Title IX to have a
broader reach than Title VI. Therefore, Blackmun concluded "that employ-
ment discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX."106
VII. A REEXAMINATION OF Trageser, IN LIGHT OF North Haven
In applying the North Haven analysis to section 504, it must first be noted
that the issue of section 604's application to the Rehabilitation Act arises in a
slightly different context than it did in Title IX. Proponents of section 604
incorporation into section 901 of the Education Amendments argued that, be-
cause section 901 was modeled after section 601, it was intended to be inter-
preted within the same boundaries as section 601. In section 504 analysis, how-
ever, the issue of section 604 incorporation hinges on the meaning of the 1978
Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, which granted to those harmed by dis-
criminatory practices the rights and remedies of Title VI. Thus, the issue
raised is whether Congress intended the Amendments to narrow the scope of
section 504 by deliberately connecting section 504 with Title VI.
Despite the mechanical difference in the way the section 604 issue arises
between Title IX and section 504, the North Haven analysis is equally appro-
priate for analyzing section 504. It addresses the basic issues of congressional
intent and statutory construction which are critical in both statutes. By using
that analysis here, it will be argued that Trageser's restrictive interpretation of
the 1978 Amendments is contrary to the legislative history and statutory reme-
dial scheme given to section 504 and that the 1978 Amendments were not in-
tended to preclude remedy to handicapped individuals denied access to that
part of the job market controlled by federal grant recipients.
Under the North Haven approach, congressional intent at the time the
Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 1973 is significant in interpreting whether
section 504 was meant to remedy discriminatory employment practices by fed-
eral grantees. Legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended the Act
to serve as a springboard toward the complete integration of the forty to sixty-
eight million handicapped children and adults into normal living, working and
' North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1922.
'05 Id. (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978)).
"I North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
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service patterns.1 0 7 This broad congressional purpose would obviously be dis-
served if the Act was shackled in the manner approved by the Trageser court.
With respect to the second factor in the Blackmun analysis, the language
and history of section 504 are strikingly contrary to the interpretation given
Title VI. As Congress had done with the administrative regulations interpret-
ing Title IX,108 they examined HEW's regulations interpreting section 504.
These regulations extended the remedies of Title VI to all forms of discrimina-
tion against the handicapped, including invidious employment practices. In the
case of section 504, Congress had explicitly approved HEW's interpretation by
amending the Act in 1978 to codify those regulations. 10 9 This kind of action by
Congress carries great weight in interpreting the meaning of the Act. In North
Haven the Court gave deference to similar action by Congress. They stated
that "where an agency's statutory construction has been fully brought to the
attention of the public and the Congress and the latter has not sought to alter
that interpretation although it has amended the statute in other respects, then
presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned." 0
Blackmun's third factor underscores the most obvious difference between
the two statutes: there is no counterpart to section 604 in section 504. Surely, if
Congress found it necessary to modify the language of the Civil Rights Act to
exempt employment practices from its coverage, it would express its reserva-
tions about the identically worded Rehabilitation Act in the same manner.
Although the differences in the legislative intent behind section 504 and
Title VI are substantial, there is an even greater contrast between the statu-
tory remedial schemes given to those harmed by violations of section 601 and
section 504, respectively. As noted previously, a denial of remedy under Title
VI merely means victims of employment discrimination must file suit under
Title VII. A similar denial of remedy under section 504 is a complete denial of
remedy.
A comparison of the remedies open to one harmed by violations of Title
IX casts further doubt on the appropriateness of applying section 604 to sec-
tion 504. Title IX was proposed as only one part of a measure that provided
remedies for sex discrimination in employment under three statutes: (1) The
mechanism utilized in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, (2) the Equal Pay Act,
and (3) the Education Amendments.
The schools in North Haven argued that the existence of alternative reme-
dies, plus the severity of the consequences for violating section 901-the termi-
nation of funds-militated against the application of section 901 to remedy
employment discrimination. Justice Blackmun found that, even if the Court
were to agree that such a policy was unwise, it was not free to reexamine con-
,07 White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act, Pub. L. No. 93-516, §§ 300-06,
88 Stat. 1631-34 (1974).108 See supra note 102.
"I See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
"0 North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1925 (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979)
and Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940)).
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gressional policy decisions. Nor was the Court free to ignore the language and
history of Title IX which indicated Congress had intentionally applied section
901 to such suits. Moreover, Congress had repeatedly provided a variety of
remedies, at times overlapping, to eradicate other forms of employment dis-
crimination."" Given the Court's recognition in North Haven, and prior cases,
that Congress regards the goal of eliminating employment discrimination im-
pbrtant enough to justify numerous remedies, it is anomalous to argue that
Congress intended to deny the handicapped the same remedies as the able-
bodied when they suffer the sting of discrimination.
VIII. Simpson v. Reynold's Metal Co.: MORE LIMITATIONS ON SUITS UNDER
SECTION 504
The Trageser standards require the handicapped plaintiff to meet two
tests before his action may proceed under section 504. In addition, he must
now meet the test of Simpson v. Reynold's Metal Co.," 2 which applies to all
suits brought under section 504, even those which do not allege employment
discrimination. Simpson imposes a substantial limitation on the broad lan-
guage of section 504 by merely relying on statutory construction; the decision
does not involve the issue of section 604 application to section 504. That issue
is relevant only to employment practices. Simpson is the current standard for
all claims brought under section 504 whether Trageser stands or fails, and it
will be examined here in terms of its effect on federally funded programs.
Simpson brought an action for employment discrimination under the Re-
habilitation Act. The court found that, although the plaintiff had standing
under the Act as a handicapped individual,"' and that the receipt of veterans
benefits in the company's on-the-job training program might constitute federal
financial assistance within the meaning of the Act, 14 the plaintiff had a more
fundamental obstacle to standing. Relying on the wording of section 504, the
court found that Simpson had not demonstrated any nexus between his dis-
charge and federal assistance."1 5 Simpson did not allege he had ever sought to
participate in the apprenticeship program, or that he was denied admittance to
the program. He was not a veteran, therefore, he could not have been a partici-
pant in the veteran's benefit program that he claimed constituted federal assis-
tance to his employer. Finally, he was not able to show any connection between
his employment and the apprenticeship program, and, hence, failed to prove
that he was "subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing federal financial assistance."" 6
"' North Haven, 102 S. Ct. at 1925 n.26.
:12 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980).
'3 Simpson, 629 F.2d at 1231 n.8. The Rehabilitation Act defines "handicapped person" for
the purposes of section 504 as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (Supp. 111978).
Simpson, 629 F.2d at 1232 n.9.
Id. at 1231.
1 Id.
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In reviewing the lower court's decision, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that section 504 does not constitute a general prohibition of discrim-
ination against the handicapped by recipients of federal assistance. 117 The very
terms of section 504:
[r]equire that the discrimination must have some direct or indirect effect on
the handicapped persons in the program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. To be actionable the discrimination must come in the operation of
the program or manifest itself in a handicapped person's exclusion from the
program or a diminution of the benefits he would otherwise receive from the
program. 18
In short, the discrimination must be in connection with a federally-funded pro-
gram or activity. The one exception to "the connection test," the court ex-
plained, is in those cases where discrimination against nonbeneficiaries affects
the beneficiaries of the assistance." 9
The Simpson court agreed with Trageser in the application of section 604
to section 504, but did not find the case controlling because of factual differ-
ences between the two cases.220 Rather, the court relied upon legislative history
which gave strong support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
extend protection beyond anyone who was an intended beneficiary of federal
financial assistance. 2 " In addition, the court found that other courts deciding
the same issue under the identical language of section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act required the plaintiff to be an intended beneficiary of, an applicant for, or
a participant in, a federally funded program.122
The court falls to discuss earlier cases holding that claims under section
504 were valid simply because they alleged discrimination in violation of the
Act.' 2 ' Simpson obviously constitutes a substantial retreat from the broad pro-
hibition against handicapped discrimination found in those earlier cases.
Nonetheless, it does appear to have the support of a substantial number of
jurisdictions which have required a nexus between the alleged discrimination
and the federally-funded program when dealing with Title VI ,124 Title IX1
25
and section 504.126 Moreover, it seems to constitute at least one reasonable in-
117 Id. at 1232.
118 Id.
"" Id. at 1235 n.16.
120 Id. at 1235. In Simpson the funding alleged to provide federal financial assistance was for
the purpose of providing employment.
121 Id. at 1235-36.
122 Id. See also N.A.A.C.P. v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1252 (3d Cir.
1979); Flora v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 1104, 1115 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
,23 See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
224 See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1252 (3d Cir.
1979); Flora v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 1104, 1115 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
125 See, e.g., Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
972 (1979); Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
1M8 See, e.g., United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908, 911 (2d Cir. 1981); Carmi,
620 F.2d at 674; Sabol, 510 F. Supp. at 895.
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terpretation of the statutory language.
Even though Simpson narrows the reach of section 504, it allows a broader
application of the statute than does Trageser. A handicapped individual who
alleges employment discrimination in violation of section 504 would appear to
have a greater likelihood of success in maintaining a cause of action under
Simpson than Trageser. While Trageser requires that defendants be the recip-
ients of financial assistance specifically targeted for providing employment,
Simpson seems to tolerate suits against parties connected directly or indirectly
with the federally funded program or activity.
Although Simpson seems reasonable on its face, the result is troubling in
that it allows for the establishment of two different standards of treatment by
the recipient. Those persons participating in the federally funded program are
protected against handicap discrimination, while federal recipients are free to
discriminate against persons included in programs within the same entity, but
not run with the benefit of federal funds. Surely Congress did not intend this
anomalous result.
The more plausible rationale is that Congress intended to effect the entire
discriminatory policy of the recipient of federal funding. Legislative history
shows that it was the intent of Congress to make the federal government the
forerunner, and thus the model, in nondiscrimination against the handi-
capped.2 7 Naturally, through the granting of federal money to private entities,
lawmakers expected to establish a standard for nondiscrimination outside the
federal government which would eventually become the norm in the private
sector. Support for the view that Congress intended to effect the entirety of
recipient's institution is found in the Senate reports accompanying the enact-
ment of the statute: "Implementation of section 504 would also include pre-
grant analysis of recipients to ensure that federal funds are not initially pro-
vided to those who discriminate against handicapped individuals.' 1 28 The lan-
guage indicates that Congress would not authorize money for those who were
engaged in handicapped discrimination; it does not limit protection to benefi-
ciaries of federally-funded programs. Congressional intent, as evidenced by this
language, is clear: federal aid is not to be given to agencies which practice dis-
crimination, whether their discriminatory practices began after the receipt of
federal aid, or were hidden from the government during pregnant analysis. De-
spite the obvious message this language conveys, Simpson dismisses the Senate
report by saying that any discrimination practiced by an employer prior to the
receipt of federal funds was obviously not in connection with a federally-
funded program or activity.129 Such cursory treatment of the issue misses the
point of Congress' focus on preventing future discrimination.
Simpson's narrow definition of "program," as constituting one program in
receipt of federal money within a multiprogram setting, seems to be accepted
127 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
128 S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6390-91.
129 Simpson, 629 F.2d at 1232 n.10.
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by a number of courts. Courts reason that Congress did not intend for a pro-
gram, run properly, "within a state, county, district, or even a school, to suffer
for the sins of others." Each program must be considered on its own merit. 30
Hence, a federal recipient of two grants may be violating section 504 in one
program and still not jeopardize its other funding.
Section 504's coverage has been further narrowed by the varying interpre-
tations given to the term "federal assistance." In Rogers v. Frito Lay, Inc., the
court stated in dicta that the term "federal financial assistance" does not com-
prehend government procurement contracts, but rather refers to the form of
grant assistance that goes primarily to the public entities. 131 A similarly narrow
interpretation was stated in Cook v. Budget Rent-A-Car,32 where the plaintiff
brought suit after the corporation refused to rent him a car solely on the basis
of his handicap. He claimed that the federal assistance requirement was met
when Budget received funds from the government under automobile rental
contracts with various federal agencies. But the court rejected this argument,
explaining that assistance does not include procurement contracts where the
government sells or purchases goods or services for its own account. Rather,
assistance means a transfer by way of subsidy or sale of government assets at a
reduced consideration.13
3
Similarly, federal subsidies to airports may subject the airports to section
504, but not the airlines who use the airports.13 4 However, licenses granted by
the federal government to commercial broadcasters do not constitute federal
assistance within the meaning of the statute.1 35 Finally, United States v.
Cabrini Medical Center 38 indicates that the receipt of medicare, medicaid,
and veteran's benefits paid for patient care will not fall under the term
financial assistance within the meaning of section 504.
The confusion created by the term financial assistance has also spilled
over into education. In Bob Jones University v. Johnson,137 for example, direct
payments made to veterans enrolled at the university were held to constitute
federal assistance. There it was held that direct payments to the university
(receiver) were not necessary to constitute the receipt of financial assistance.
The pertinent questions were: (1) whether the federally subsidized [benefi-
130 Board of Pub. Instr. v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969). Accord Brown v. Sibley,
650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981). Employees of Mississippi Industries for the Blind (MIB) were denied
standing under section 504 although MIB received Title XX funds for social services and day care
along with funds for a satellite workshop. There was no allegation that the plaintiff employees
were excluded from participation or subjected to discrimination in the specific programs in receipt
of federal funding. In Miller v. Abilene Christian University, 517 F. Supp. 437 (N.D. Tex. 1981),
the plaintiff employee was denied standing where the school had administered only federal grant
and loan programs for students.
131 433 F. Supp. 200, 204 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 874 (1980).
"1 502 F. Supp. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
33 Id. at 496.
131 Angel v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1173 (D.D.C. 1981).
131 Gottfried v. F.C.C., 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
138 639 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1981).
117 396 F. Supp. 597 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975).
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ciary] participated in a program or activity and, (2) if so, whether that program
or activity was in receipt of federal financial assistance.135 The university was
considered a recipient because the money paid to the student released institu-
tional funds which would otherwise be spent on assisting students with educa-
tional costs.1 39 The benefits paid to the veterans also enlarged the pool of ap-
plicants upon which the school could draw.140
IX. CONCLUSION
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in North Haven the current stan-
dard for suits challenging employment practices under the Rehabilitation Act
is erroneous and should be reevaluated. North Haven's emphasis on Congress'
intent in passing the Act is refreshing. The legislative history of the Rehabili-
tation Act shows that Congress intended to equalize employment opportunities
for the handicapped. Yet Trageser permits the employment restriction to deny
all remedy to most victims of handicap discrimination.
The standard utilized by Simpson would also be aided by such an exami-
nation. While the standard may comport with the language of the statute, it
frustrates Congress' goal of setting nondiscriminatory standards in agencies re-
ceiving federal money. Simpson allows a dual standard of treatment for the
handicapped by forbidding discrimination of those involved in the programs
utilizing the federal money, but condoning such treatment in nonfederally
funded programs within the same agency. Such a system of review is an insult
to the congressional goal of equal opportunity for the handicapped under sec-
tion 504.
With the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act, Congress intended to re-
move the consequences of handicap-based employment discrimination. For
generations families have been left to carry the burden of handicapped mem-
bers who are unable to provide for themselves. When the family is no longer
able to provide for the handicapped member he or she becomes dependent on
the state. For many handicapped persons too severely disabled to work this
cycle will continue. But for millions of handicapped persons dependency on
others is unnecessary, because they are able to work productively in the job
market and lead meaningful lives. Once in the job market the handicapped
person has the economic ability to provide for himself independent of family
and government.
With section 504, Congress has provided the handicapped with increased
mobility, education and access to many more opportunities taken for granted
in the daily life of the nonhandicapped American. But somewhere in the midst
of complex statutory analysis courts interpreting section 504 have lost sight of
the goals of the Act. Section 504 is of little assistance to the handicapped
138 Bob Jones, 396 F. Supp. 601-03.
"' Id.
140 Id. at 603.
[Vol. 85
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss3/7
1983] DEATH KNELL 391
youth, trained, educated and transported to the doorstep of his adult working
life, if employers may refuse to let him in.
M. Katherine Webster-O'Keefe
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